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SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 46 AUTUMN 1994 NUMBER 1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. COURT FINDS DIVERSION OF GAS TAX
REVENUES CONSTITUTIONALLY ACCEPTABLE
In Myers v. Patterson' the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
sections of the 1992 Appropriations Act that diverted tax revenues to the
state's general fund from a specially created separate fund were constitution-
al.2 In doing so, the court interpreted Article X, Section 5 of the South
Carolina Constitution, thus superseding previous cases.
The legislature created the separate fund in 1987 for the benefit of the
Strategic Highway Plan for Improving Mobility and Safety (SHIMS).3 This
same legislation increased the gasoline tax by three cents per gallon to provide
revenues for the fund.4 The revenues derived from this tax must be remitted
to the State Treasurer, who then credits them to the SHIMS fund.5 The
purpose of SHIMS was to finance certain highway projects described in the
act.
6
In 1992, the General Assembly moved $25 million from the SHIMS fund
to the state's general fund to pay the state's indebtedness resulting from
damages caused by Hurricane Hugo.7 More specifically, it provided that
money accruing to SHIMS between July 1, 1992 and August 31, 1992 would
go into the state's general fund up to $25 million. If contributions made to the
fund did not total $25 million by August 31, 1992, the Act allowed the state
1. _ S.C. _, 433 S.E.2d 841 (1993).
2. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-27-1210 to -1320 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
4. Id. §§ 12-27-1210 to -1240.
5. Id. § 12-27-1260.
6. Id. § 12-27-1280 (repealed 1993). Under this section, the Department of Highways and
Public Transportation was required to submit a list of 50 priority projects to be funded from
SHIMS to the Select Oversight Committee (created by S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-27-1300 (repealed
1993)). The list would be updated annually thereafter. In choosing the specific projects, the
Department was directed to consider certain socioeconomic factors, including per capita
employment, farm acres per square mile, per capita income, population per square mile, and
existing interstate and primary road mileage per square mile.
7. 1992 S.C. Acts 3249, Part I, § 129.65.
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to borrow the difference from SHIMS money collected before July 1, 1992.
The state would pay back the borrowed money from future revenues accruing
to SHIMS.'
The General Assembly provided also that all interest accruing to the
SHIMS fund during the 1992-93 fiscal year would be credited to the general
fund rather than the SHIMS fund.9 There was no pay-back provision for the
interest.
As taxpayers, William C. Myers, Edward T. McMullen, Jr., and the
South Carolina Policy Council Education Foundation brought suit against State
Treasurer Grady L. Patterson, Jr., the members of the South Carolina
Highways and Public Transportation Commission, and Walker P. Ragin, the
Executive Director of the Commission. Plaintiffs prayed for an injunction to
prevent the transfer of funds. A circuit judge issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent the transfer but dissolved it the next day upon request by the
State Treasurer.10
A few days later, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a
temporary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs failed to show that they would
suffer irreparable injury if an injunction did not issue." After the transfer,
the supreme court granted plaintiffs' petition to hear the case in the court's
original jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs alleged violation of two sections of the South Carolina
Constitution. First, they contended that Article X, Section 5 was violated
because it requires the spending of public funds only for the purpose stated
when levying the tax. This section reads in part: "Any tax which shall be
levied shall distinctly state the public purpose to which the proceeds of the tax
shall be applied."" Plaintiffs argued that this provision prevents the
legislature from levying a tax for one purpose and then diverting the resulting
revenues to another. 3
The SHIMS legislation clearly described the purpose of the levy in several
places. For example, the code provided that the additional tax money
8. Id.
9. 1992 S.C. Acts 3216, Part I, § 124.27 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-27-1260 by
deleting the sentence "[a]ll earnings on investments from this fund must accrue to and be
deposited in this separate fund," for the fiscal year 1992-93).
10. Myers, _ S.C. at_, 433 S.E.2d at 842. According to the State Treasurer, the state's
AAA bond rating was at risk if the injunction was not dissolved. The state needed to address the
deficit to maintain the AAA bond rating, which is the highest bond rating and is shared only by
five other states. This bond rating has saved taxpayers millions of dollars in financing certain
projects, including schools, prison facilities, and road and park facilities. Affidavit of Grady L.
Patterson, Jr., in Addendum to Consent Petition for Original Jurisdiction of Defendant Treasurer
at 33.
11. Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 842-43.
12. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5.
13. Brief of Plaintiffs at 8.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
generated "must be used to fund the provisions of [SHIMS]."14 Additionally,
it provided that "[a]ll unappropriated money in this fund must remain part of
the separate fund" and that "[n]o funds may be expended from this account for
any purpose other than for payment of engineering and planning, right-of-way
acquisition, and construction of projects on the list submitted .... "I
The plaintiffs argued that this specific language evidenced the General
Assembly's intent that this fund be "dedicated funds, collected and held in
trust, to be used only for their stated purpose." 6 The specific purpose of
SHIMS, the highway projects, was unaccomplished when the diversion
occurred. 7 The plaintiffs argued that because amendment of the purpose of
a tax levy is unconstitutional until its purpose has been accomplished, the
legislature wrongfully diverted the money.' 8
Second, plaintiffs claimed that Article X, Section 7, requiring that South
Carolina maintain a balanced budget, had been violated. This section reads
in part: "The General Assembly shall provide by law for a budget process to
insure that annual expenditures of state government may not exceed annual
state revenue."' 9 The plaintiffs contended that the 1992 Appropriations Act
ran a deficit while taking the difference needed from the SHIMS account.
They contended also that the diversion constituted a breach of fiduciary duty
by the defendants, who were charged with the maintenance of the SHIMS
funds.
20
The defendant South Carolina Highways and Public Transportation
Commission agreed with the plaintiffs that the revenue diversion violated
Article X, Section 5.21 Specifically, it argued that Article X, Section 5 was
violated for two reasons. First, the General Assembly was applying the
proceeds from SHIMS to a purpose other than that for which they were levied.
Second, the General Assembly diverted the interest accruing to SHIMS funds
to its general fund. This violated Article X, Section 5 because interest earned
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-27-1260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
15. Id. § 12-27-1260 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
16. Brief of Plaintiffs at 9 (citing Kirk v. Clark, 191 S.C. 205, 4 S.E.2d 13 (1939)). In their
brief, plaintiffs quoted from an opinion of the Attorney General dated March 19, 1992 which
stated that "[t]he 'SHIMS' funds are in the nature of a trust and... may not be diverted until
the accomplishment of the purpose for which the funds was [sic] established." Id. at 10. This
opinion was supposedly given while the legislature debated the General Appropriations bill. Id.
at 13.
17. Id. at 7-8.
18. Id. at 13-14.
19. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 7.
20. Brief of Plaintiffs at 1. Plaintiffs never addressed directly this breach of fiduciary duty;
instead it blended in with the alleged constitutional violations.
21. Brief of Defendant South Carolina Highways and Public Transportation Commission at
1994]
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on a special fund does not differ from the fund and, thus, already has a
designated purpose.'
However, the Commission declared that it had no power to control the
transfer of the funds from the SHIMS account. All of the SHIMS revenue was
remitted directly to the State Treasurer, as directed by South Carolina Code
Section 12-27-1260, who then transferred the money to the General Fund."
The State Treasurer argued first that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had no
standing to bring the lawsuit. The Treasurer argued also that the transfer of
funds was constitutional (under both allegedly violated provisions) because it
affected only prospective revenues. The Treasurer could make this argument
because any money taken from the SHIMS account raised before July 1, 1992
was only borrowed and would be replenished during the 1992-93 fiscal year.
Thus, the General Assembly attempted to use a cash flow management device.
The Treasurer argued that because the revenues were collected after notice of
the diversion, amendment of the original purpose was possible because public
policy allowed amendment before all SHIMS purposes were accomplished.24
The court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the
action. In finding standing, the court noted the rule that private citizens
cannot restrain official acts unless they allege and prove damage to themselves
that differs in character from damage sustained by the public generally.'
However, an exception exists when the statute authorizes an unlawful diversion
of funds; a taxpayer who must pay the tax or who already has contributed to
the diverted fund has a sufficient interest to try to enjoin the act.26 In Shillito
v. City of Spartanbur 7 the court stated that "[a] citizen and taxpayer has
standing as such to contest the expenditure of public funds under an alleged
unconstitutional statute."28  The court also referred to Kirk v. Clark,
29
which states that "a taxpayer may maintain an action in equity, on behalf of
himself and all other taxpayers, to restrain public officers from paying out
public money for purposes unauthorized by law."30
The court never addressed directly the other issues argued by the parties
because of the court's decision that an amendment to former Article X,
Section 3 of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895 (becoming Article X,
Section 5 in the South Carolina Constitution of 1976) changed the Constitutio-
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Brief of Defendant State Treasurer at 10-17.
25. Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
26. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843 (citing Shillito v. City of Spartanburg, 214 S.C. 11, 51
S.E.2d 95 (1948)).
27. 214 S.C. 11, 51 S.E.2d 95 (1948).
28. Id. at 22, 51 S.E.2d at 99 (citing 52 AM. JUR. § 3).
29. 191 S.C. 205, 4 S.E.2d 13 (1939).
30. Id. at 210, 4 S.E.2d at 15.
[Vol. 46
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss1/3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
n's meaning, rendering all other points moot. Former Article X, Section 3
stated: "No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of a law which shall
distinctly state the object of the same; to which object the tax shall be
applied."31 The court did not overrule prior decisions holding diversions
similar to the present one unconstitutional under this provision; it recognized
that these decisions were based on a construction of the former constitutional
provision that was supported by precedent.32 For example, two cases relied
on by the plaintiffs, State ex rel. Edwards v. OsbornP3 (Edwards 1) and State
ex rel. Edwards v. Osborne34 (Edwards II) held that former Article X,
Section 3 prohibited the diversion of tax revenues to purposes other than those
given for levying the tax.
According to the court, Article X, Section 5 effectively eradicated this
prohibition. The court held that the amended provision "only requires the
Legislature to state the public purpose for which taxes are levied."" Thus,
it concluded that a legislature can subsequently amend the public purpose of
tax proceeds: "In our view, the effect of the 1977 amendment was to remove
the constitution's limitation of the Legislature's power to appropriate revenues
as needed among legitimate government objectives. "3
Applying this new rule, the court found that because the statute directing
the diversion was not a tax levy but an appropriation, Article X, Section 5
would not apply.37 Article X, Section 5 applies only to tax levies, and the
court held that because Sections 129.65 and 124.27 of the 1992 Appropriations
Act38 did not create any new tax or fix "the amount or rate [of a tax] to be
imposed,"39 it was not a tax levy.
Having found no violation of Article X, Section 5, the court found that
it did not need to decide the constitutionality of the diversion under Article X,
Section 7. 4
In making its decision, the court gave no indication of relying on
legislative intent as affecting the impact of the 1977 amendment to Article X,
Section 3. The plaintiffs and the South Carolina Highways and Public
Transportation Commission contended in their petitions for rehearing that the
court should have considered the legislative history of the 1977 amendment
before it changed the provision's substantive meaning. 4 The plaintiffs noted
31. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3 (amended 1977).
32. Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
33. 193 S.C. 158, 7 S.E.2d 526 (1940).
34. 195 S.C. 295, 11 S.E.2d 260 (1940).
35. Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
36. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
37. Id. at __, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
38. 1992 S.C. Acts 501.
39. Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
40. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 844.
41. See Memorandum Supporting Petition for Rehearing of Defendant South Carolina
19941
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that case law favored reliance on both the former provision and the legislative
history.42
The language of the new provision and the legislative history suggested
that the legislature did not intend to make anything more than a stylistic
change to former Article X, Section 3. First, the plaintiffs noted that the
legislature left the language "to which object the tax shall be applied" 43 in the
text of the article. This mandatory language indicated legislative intent to
continue the prohibition against diversion of revenues already levied for a
particular purpose.'
Additionally, plaintiffs cited the legislative history of the amendment.
The Committee to Make a Study of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895
created the text of the amendment. This committee stated that, regarding
Article X, § 5, "[m]inor revisions have been made. . . . "41 Both houses of
the legislature accepted the wording of the Committee and passed the
amendment with no further revisions.
The supreme court effectively deleted a constitutional provision effective
in the South Carolina Constitution for more than one hundred years. Although
under the new meaning of Article X, Section 5 a public purpose still must be
stated, this purpose is formal at best because at any time the legislature can
change it. This change brings into question the true role of the requirement
for stating a public purpose in the context of a tax levy. Arguably, such a
requirement no longer has any force, especially because the court held that
appropriations changing the purpose of a tax levy come under no Article X,
Section 5 scrutiny.46
Highways and Public Transportation Commission at 3. The Commission quotes from the case
of Miller v. Farr, 243 S.C. 342, 347, 133 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1963), which stated that a
constitutional amendment must be interpreted by examining legislative intent: "[W]hen
construing a constitutional amendment, the Court applies rules similar to those relating to the
construction of statutes, in its effort to determine the intent of its framers and of the people who
adopted it."
42. See Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing of Plaintiff at 10 (arguing that
"[t]his court has previously explained that amendments should not be interpreted to signal a
departure from precedent unless their language plainly requires a change in construction."). See
also Abell v. Bell, 229 S.C. 1, 5, 91 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1956) (stating that a statute must be
interpreted by the evidenced legislative intent, and that where the language of the statute raises
uncertainty, intent must be discerned from reading the statute "in the light of the circumstances
and conditions existing at the time of its enactment"); Town of Forest Acres v. Seigler, 224 S.C.
166, 173, 77 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1953) (stating that when a code section's meaning is ambiguous,
"resort may be had to the act from which the provision was derived").
43. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3 (amended 1977) (emphasis added).
44. Petition for Rehearing of Plaintiff at 9.
45. Id. at 12.
46. See Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
[Vol. 46
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The court may have relied implicitly on public policy favoring the
amendment of laws in making its decision. As a general rule, a legislature
should be allowed to amend or repeal statutes enacted in previous years unless
doing so would violate constitutional limitations.47 In this case the State
Treasurer argued that disallowing the SHIMS diversion would allow the
legislature to set up a tax levy that would bind the legislature in perpetuity to
appropriate revenues to those purposes.4" With limited tax revenue available,
it would be unfair to forbid the legislature from shifting funds as it sees
necessary to respond to the state's changing needs.
Although this rationale always has applied to general state funds,
exceptions exist. One example of allowing one legislature to bind a subse-
quent one is bond indebtedness. Once a tax levy is created to repay
obligations incurred by the state, a subsequent legislature cannot amend or
repeal it because it would effectuate an impairment of contracts in violation of
South Carolina Constitution Article I, Section 4. The court did not exclude
the area of bond indebtedness from its holding, leaving an apparent conflict
between Article I, Section 4 and Article X, Section 5.
Perhaps overlapping with the first, another exception is legislative
attempts to amend the purpose of a special fund before the accomplishment of
the original purpose. However, the court interpreted the 1977 amendment as
intending to reverse this exception in favor of deference to the legislature.
The court's statement that the legislature should have the power to "appropri-
ate revenues as needed among legitimate government objectives" evidences
this. 
4 9
Thus the court has limited the concept of a continuing appropriation. The
parties argued extensively about the definition of a continuing appropriation
and whether it applied in this case. The Treasurer argued that the language
of the statute levying the tax determined whether there was a continuing
appropriation."0 Because the language of the statutes in the Edwards cases
expressly appropriated the funds, they were inapposite to the present case.5
The plaintiffs argued that when determining whether there is a continuing
appropriation, the court should focus on the nature of the purpose for which
the tax levy and appropriation were enacted.52 While the SHIMS statute may
not have stated expressly that an appropriation would be made every year, it
47. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905); Boatwright v. McElmurray, 247 S.C.
199, 146 S.E.2d 716 (1966).
48. Brief of Defendant State Treasurer at 13.
49. Myers, _ S.C. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 843.
50. Brief of Defendant State Treasurer at 11.
51. See Edwards H, 195 S.C. at 315, 11 S.E.2d 260 at 268 (defining a continuing
appropriationas "running on from year to year without further legislative action until the purpose
for which the levy and appropriation were made has been accomplished").
52. Brief of Plaintiffs at 12 (citing Edwards 11, 195 S.C. at 315, 11 S.E.2d at 268).
19941
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specifically provided for a separate fund to carry out certain purposes
determined annually.
Implicit in the parties' arguments was that if SHIMS created a continuing
appropriation, the legislature could not amend its purpose until accomplished.
After the court's holding in Myers, the concept of changing the purpose of a
continuing appropriation would be germane only if another constitutional
limitation (other than Article X, Section 5) were violated. If no other section
of the constitution were violated, the legislature could amend or repeal prior
statutes. Thus, the issue becomes whether this broad holding may possibly be
limited by future threats to other constitutional provisions.
A possible competing policy argument is that citizens should know where
their tax money goes when collected. Article X, Section 5 evidences this
consideration by providing that "[n1o tax, subsidy or charge shall be
established, fixed, laid or levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the
consent of the people or their representatives lawfully assembled." 3 The
court showed some deference to this policy by recognizing that the part of
Article X, Section 5 in controversy still required a statement of a specific
public purpose. Seemingly, then, when an amendment of a tax levy's purpose
is made, the legislature should afford the public the same notice. Because the
decision in Myers may allow diversion of revenues collected prior to the
amendment, the people or their representatives could not consent when the tax
revenues are collected.
The parties' discussion of whether the statute authorizing diversion
applied retroactively to revenues collected prior to the amendment evidences
this notice policy. The distinction was the crux of the Treasurer's argument.
Allowing an amendment of the tax levy's purpose to retroactively apply,
ostensibly for one purpose, seems to violate the constitutional mandate that the
people consent to the tax. The Treasurer recognized this because it was
argued that the diversion in question affected prospective revenues only.
However, the court was silent on this issue, indicating one of two things.
First, the court agreed with the Treasurer's argument that only prospective
revenues were diverted from the SHIMS account (perhaps implicitly opening
the door for future cases to limit its holding on this ground). Even the cases
under old Article X, Section 3 seemed to distinguish between prior and
prospective revenues. In Edwards I the diversion was from prior revenues,
as was obvious by the wording of the appropriation bill.54 In Edwards II the
court found specifically that the case involved only prior revenues.55 Case
law decided under old Article X, Section 3 suggested that amendment of the
53. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5.
54. Edwards 1, 193 S.C. at 163, 7 S.E.2d at 528.
55. Edwards 11, 195 S.C. at 316, 11 S.E.2d at 268.
[Vol. 46
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public purpose of a tax levy affecting prospective revenues would be allowed
unless a legal obligation of the state were involved.56
Second, it does not matter now whether a diversion of funds pursuant to
an amendment of a tax levy's purpose dips into revenues already collected
under the assumption that they would be spent for the original purpose. If this
is the opinion's actual meaning, perhaps courts can limit future holdings to the
facts of this case, where the appropriation bill provided also for replenishing
of the depleted funds to carry out the original purpose. However, the opinion
does not attempt to distinguish one-time-only diversions and permanent
amendments forever diverting revenues.
In conclusion, the meaning of the public purpose requirement in Article
X, Section 5 of the South Carolina Constitution is subject to much speculation
after Myers. Future cases in this area will have the task of limiting the present
holding.
Seann Gray Hazzard
II. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS NOT VIOLATED
BY MANDATORY LICENSE SUSPENSION
In Yeargin v. South Carolina Department of Highways & Public
Transportation1 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the constitution-
al issues surrounding driver's license suspension procedures under South
Carolina statutes. The court held that due process does not require a hearing
before the state suspends an individual's license under the mandatory
suspension statutes.2  Furthermore, the court held that adding together
successive suspension periods does not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment.3
Yeargin received three convictions for driving under the influence (DUX)
and five for driving under suspension (DUS). As a result, the Department4
56. See, e.g., State ex rel. Branch v. Leaphart, 11 S.C. 458, 471 (1878) (discussing the
holding in Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller General, 4 S.C. 430 (1873), and explaining that
[Tihe provisions of acts intended to borrow money should operate as legislative
contracts, so that the authority for the levy of a tax to pay the interest on any such
loan, which is required to be given in such acts, could not be taken away by any
subsequent act of repeal. Furthermore, "[w]here ... the legislature retains its
ordinary power over appropriations, not having assumed to bind itself by a legislative
contract, there can be no doubt but that it can repeal the authority for the disburse-
ment of public money, whether raised under general or special levy.").
1. _ S.C._, 438 S.E.2d 234 (1993) (per curiam).
2. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235.
3. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235-36.
4. The South Carolina Department of Public Safety replaced the South Carolina Department
9
Hazzard et al.: Constitutional Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
suspended his driver's license for several consecutive periods extending to
February 15, 1995. Yeargin brought an action seeking to have his license
reinstated. The circuit court found that the suspensions violated Yeargin's due
process rights because he had no effective means of appealing the suspensions.
The judge consequently ordered reinstatement of Yeargin's license. The
Department appealed the decision, and the supreme court reversed.5
The supreme court found that the Department need not provide a hearing
for a license suspension if the licensee has been convicted of a traffic offense
for which suspension is mandatory.6 The statutes cited by the court provide
that license suspension is mandatory upon a conviction of DUI or DUS.7
Referring to earlier cases, the court asserted "that such suspensions are
mandatory and are not decisions within the Department's discretion."'
Therefore, applicable statutes required that the Department refuse Yeargin a
hearing.
The circuit court concluded erroneously that the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA) was not in effect at the time of Yeargin's first suspension and
that Yeargin consequently had no effective means of challenging the
suspension.9 The supreme court recognized, however, that although the APA
was in effect, the APA afforded no hearing in license suspension cases.1°
Under the APA, a "contested case" is "a proceeding, including . . . licensing,
in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law
of Highways and Public Transportation on July 1, 1993.
5. Yeargin, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235-36.
6. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 235. The court quoted from section 56-1-300 which provides
in part:
In addition to other authority of law, the Department of Public Safety may suspend
or revoke the license of a driver without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its
records or other sufficient evidence that licensee: (1) Has been convicted of an
offense for which mandatory revocation or suspension is required upon conviction.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
7. Yeargin, _ S.C. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 235. The court relied on sections 56-1-280, 56-
1-460, and 56-5-2990. Section 56-1-280 provides that the Department shall "revoke or suspend
the license of any driver upon receiving a record of such driver's conviction of any offense for
which revocation or suspension is required by law." Under section 56-1-460, the Department
must extend an individual's suspensionperiod upon receipt of conviction record for driving under
suspension. Section 56-5-2990 provides that the Department shall suspend the license of an
individual convicted of driving under the influence. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1-280, 56-1-460,
56-5-2990 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
8. Yeargin, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235 (citing Cummings v. South Carolina State
Highway Dep't, 271 S.C. 89, 245 S.E.2d 127 (1978); Brewer v. South Carolina State Highway
Dep't, 261 S.C. 52, 198 S.E.2d 256 (1973); and Parker v. State Highway Dep't, 224 S.C. 263,
78 S.E.2d 382 (1953)).
9. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 235.
10. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235.
[Vol. 46
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to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing ... ."" The
court found that driver's license suspensions did not meet this definition of
contested case, presumably because the mandatory license suspension statutes
do not call for hearings before imposition of suspensions. Therefore, the court
held that the APA did not entitle Yeargin to a hearing. 2
Ultimately the court concluded that due process does not require a hearing
for a license suspension. 3 The court explained that procedures in the
underlying criminal convictions that provided the grounds for the suspensions
protected Yeargin's due process.' Therefore, although Yeargin received no
hearing before his suspensions, his right to due process was not violated.
Conviction procedures satisfied due process without need for further hearings
at the license suspension stage.'5
The supreme court held further that the circuit court erred in finding that
Yeargin's consecutive suspensions constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment.' 6 Driver's license suspension is not part of the punishment for a traffic
offense;' 7 therefore, the court concluded that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause does not apply in a license suspension setting. 8
The court added that even if the clause were relevant, the suspension
would not violate the clause because it only "prohibits sentences which are
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 9 Yeargin's suspen-
sions were proportionate to his individual DUI and DUS infractions, and the
resulting continuous suspension until February 1995 resulted merely from
Yeargin's "repeated violations of the law. "I The court cited with approval
an earlier case2' permitting the Department to add suspension periods
consecutively instead of allowing the suspensions to overlap, reducing the total
suspension period. The court held that Yeargin's lengthy suspension did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.'
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (quoted in Yeargin, __ S.C.
at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235).
12. Yeargin, _ S.C. at_, 438 S.E.2d at 235.
13. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 235.
14. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 235.
15. Id. at , 438 S.E.2d at 235 (citing Arizona v. Jennings, 722 P.2d 258 (Ariz. 1986) and
Wells v. Roberts, 280 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 1981)).
16. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 235-36.
17. Yeargin, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 235 (citing Brewer).
18. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 236.
19. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 236 (citing State v. Kiser, 288 S.C. 441, 343 S.E.2d 292
(1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986)).
20. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 236 (citing Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Sumnimerford, 280 F. Supp.
406 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 9 (1968)).
21. Bay v. South Carolina Highway Dep't, 266 S.C. 9, 221 S.E.2d 106 (1975).
22. Yeargin, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 236. See also Pennsylvaniav. Ryan, 556 A.2d
1377, 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citing Pennsylvania v. Hoover, 494 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super.
1994]
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In reaching its conclusions, the Yeargin court relied upon precedent. In
Parker v. State Highway Department,' the court addressed whether the
Department could suspend an individual's license during the pendency of a
DUI conviction appeal.' The relevant statute provided for mandatory license
suspension upon the Department's receipt of a DUI conviction report. The
court noted that "[n]o discretion is allowed in the matter."' The court
continued:
The suspension follows as a consequence and effect of committing the
offense. It is a forfeiture of the privilege to drive, due to the failure of the
licensee to observe certain conditions under which the license was issued.
The suspension constitutes no part of the punishment fixed by the court,
nor is it an added punishment for the offense committed. It is civil and
not criminal in its nature.
26
The court pointed out "that the purpose of the revocation is to protect the
public and not to punish the licensee."27 Because the suspension did not
constitute punishment, an appeal did not prevent immediate imposition of the
suspension.2
Although the Department can suspend an individual's license during
appeal, in Brewer v. South Carolina State Highway Department'9 the court
held that the Department cannot suspend a license if the licensee is granted a
new trial after conviction for a DUI offense.3" In Brewer, the State charged
the respondent with DUI. Apparently due to an administrative error, the
respondent subsequently was convicted on the charge even though he was
absent from the hearing and had not received notice. After respondent's
motion, the magistrate granted a new trial.31 The supreme court found such
relief appropriate in these circumstances and held that a new trial "places the
party accused in the same position as if no trial had ever been had."
32
Ct. 1985), appeal denied, 565 A.2d 1166 (1989), for the principle that "the imposition of
mandatory license suspensions did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because such a
penalty is neither disproportionateto the gravity of the offense nor repugnantto societal standards
of justice").
23. 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E.2d 382 (1953).
24. Id. at 266-67, 78 S.E.2d at 383.
25. Id. at 271, 78 S.E.2d at 385 (citing Emmertson v. State Tax Comm'n, 72 P.2d 467 (Utah
1937)).
26. Id. at 271, 78 S.E.2d at 385 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at271, 78 S.E.2d at 386 (quoting Prichard v. Battle, 17 S.E.2d 393,396 (Va. 1941)).
28. Parker, 224 S.C. at 272, 78 S.E.2d at 386.
29. 261 S.C. 52, 198 S.E.2d 256 (1973).
30. Id. at 57, 198 S.E.2d at 258.
31. Id. at 54-55, 198 S.E.2d at 256-57.
32. Id. at 57, 198 S.E.2d at 258 (citing State v. Squires, 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 601
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Therefore, the court concluded that "there [was] no basis upon which the
suspension of [the respondent's] driver's license [could] be sustained."
33
In Cummings v. South Carolina State Highway Department,34 the court
reiterated the mandatory nature of license suspensions under the statutes.
Citing Parker and Brewer, the court recognized that the Department is
required to suspend a license upon a DUI conviction and that the trial court
has no discretion to alter such suspensions. 35 Therefore, the court held that
the trial court had erred in reducing a mandatory two-year suspension to one
year.
36
The supreme court relied on two cases from other jurisdictions to find that
due process does not require a hearing for a driver's license suspension. In
Arizona v. Jennings,37 the defendant's license was revoked under a statute
providing for mandatory revocation upon conviction of certain offenses.
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Burson,3
the defendant contended that his failure to receive a hearing to review the
revocation violated his due process rights. The Arizona Supreme Court
responded:
Revocation, pursuant to this section [of the Arizona statute],39 occurs only
after a conviction has become final for one of the enumerated offenses.
The driver then has already had the opportunity for a full trial before the
mandatory provision of [the statute] applies. . . . We, therefore, agree
with the court of appeals that "[d]ue process is already afforded violators
under [the statute] within the process of conviction."
40
Thus, the court rejected the defendant's argument and found the statutory
procedure constitutionally adequate.
In Wells v. Roberts,4' the West Virginia Supreme Court examined the
differences between two West Virginia license suspension statutes.42 One
statute provided for discretionary suspension when no previous adjudication
of guilt existed on the underlying criminal charges; the statute required "a
(1966)).
33. Id. at 57, 198 S.E.2d at 258.
34. 271 S.C. 89, 245 S.E.2d 127 (1978).
35. Id. at 91, 245 S.E.2d at 128.
36. Id. at 90-91, 245 S.E.2d at 128.
37. 722 P.2d 258 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane).
38. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
39. ARIz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 28-445 (1976).
40. Jennings, 722 P.2d at 261 (quoting Arizona v. Jennings, 722 P.2d 334, 336 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1985).
41. 280 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 1981).
42. W. VA. CODE §§ 17B-3-6, 17B-3-5 (1974).
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prompt administrative hearing" in these instances.43 The other statute
provided, however, for mandatory revocation without an opportunity for a
hearing, following a conviction for certain offenses. The court held that this
mandatory revocation procedure did not violate due process because the
underlying criminal conviction afforded all of the constitutionally necessary
process. 44 The court stated, "A determination of the facts by a [trial court]
provided all the necessary elements of due process prior to revocation...
because the criminal proceeding decided the very issue which triggered the
possibility of revocation - the licensee's liability for driving while intoxicat-
ed. "
45
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed directly the
constitutionality of mandatory license suspension statutes. The Court has
confronted the license suspension issue in other contexts, however. In Bell v.
Burson the Court discussed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute' calling
for suspension of the "vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured
motorist involved in an accident . . . unless he posts security to cover the
amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the acci-
dent."' In that case, a child drove her bicycle into the petitioner's car.
Subsequently, the State notified petitioner about the bond requirement and the
possibility of license suspension. The petitioner requested an administrative
hearing at which he contested liability for the child's injuries. The Director
refused to accept the petitioner's evidence on the liability issue because the
hearing's purpose was only to consider whether an accident had occurred and
whether the petitioner had complied with the statutory requirements. On
appeal, the court found that the petitioner was not at fault and ordered that the
petitioner's license not be suspended until suit was filed against him. The
Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently reversed.48
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court stated:
In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural
due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. This is but an
application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints
limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is
denominated a "right" or a "privilege."
49
43. Wells, 280 S.E.2d at 269.
44. Id.
45. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on
Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds, 416 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Mass. 1981)).
46. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601 to -621 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
47. Bell, 402 U.S. at 535-36 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601 to -621 (1958 & Supp.
1970).-
48. Id. at 537-38.
49. Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 46
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss1/3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Court held that due process did not require a "full adjudication of the
question of liability" in these presuspension hearings; 5 rather, "procedural
due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether
there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being
rendered against the licensee. "M The Court stated that the Georgia statutory
scheme violated due process because it made liability an important factor in
the license suspension decision but did not allow a consideration of this factor
in presuspension hearings.52
The Yeargin decision comports with the constitutional standards of Bell
even though South Carolina statutes do not provide for pre- or postsuspension
hearings. Bell requires some form of a hearing on the "important factors" in
a license suspension decision; however, under the South Carolina statutes, the
criminal trial on the DUI or DUS charges affords the process demanded by
Bell. Under the South Carolina scheme, the important factor in the state's
decision to suspend is whether the individual drove under the influence of
alcohol or drove under suspension. The licensee has an opportunity to prove
innocence, and thereby to avoid license suspension, during the criminal trial
on the DUI or DUS charges. After conviction, the critical issue has been
decided and the license suspension follows automatically. Because the statutes
make suspension mandatory in such cases, a hearing on the suspension would
serve no further purpose.
Joshua M. Henderson
III. AMENDMENT To FURLOUGH LAW DOES NOT
IMPLICATE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE
In Plyler v. Evatt' (Plyler fl) the South Carolina Supreme Court
interpreted section 24-13-7202 (section 720) of the Supervised Furlough
50. Id. at 540.
51. Id.
52. Bell, 402 U.S. at 541.
1. _ S.C. _, 438 S.E.2d 244 (1993).
2. The court interpreted the statute before its 1993 amendment. The preamendment statute
provided:
Unless sentenced to life inprisomnent [sic], an inmate under the jurisdiction or control
of the Department of Corrections shall, within six months of the expiration of his
sentence, be placed with the program provided for in § 24-13-710 and shall be subject
to every rule, regulation, and condition of such program. No inmate otherwise
eligible under the provisions of this section for placement with the program under §
24-13-710 may be so placed unless he has maintained a clear disciplinary record for
at least six months prior to eligibility for placement with such program.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-720 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (amended 1993).
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Program for prisoners, deciding the constitutional impact of the 1993
amendment to that statute under the Ex Post Facto Clause.4 The court held
that the preamendment version of section 720 mandated the release of all
prisoners who had only six months of their sentences left except those
prisoners with life sentences or recent disciplinary infractions. The court held
that section 720 did not incorporate the stricter eligibility requirements of
section 24-13-710 s (section 710), which excluded violent offenders from a
similar program. The 1993 amendment to section 720 added the eligibility
requirements of section 710. The court found that the Amendment changed
the law and did not merely clarify it.6 The court held further that the only
prisoners entitled to release under the preamendment version of section 720
were those already eligible for release before the amendment's effective date.7
The court held that the Supervised Furlough Program was not part of the
inmates' sentences, and thus there is no ex post facto violation in applying the
amended statute to those who committed offenses before the amendment.8
The court treated alike the programs under sections 710 and 720 for ex post
facto analysis, allowing only a narrow class of inmates immediate release.
The statutes establish Supervised Furlough Programs where certain
prisoners can gain early release from prison. State probation and parole
agents supervise the released inmates until the inmates become eligible for
parole or until their sentences expire.9 The agencies refer to the program
under section 710 as Supervised Furlough I (SF1) and the program under
section 720 as Supervised Furlough II (SFII).' ° The requirements for
3. The amended statute provides:
Unless sentenced to life imprisonment, an inmate under the jurisdiction or control of
the Department of Corrections who has not been convicted of a violent crime under
the provisions of Section 16-1-60 may, within six months of the expiration of his
sentence, be placed with the program provided for in Section 24-13-710 and is subject
to every rule, regulation, and condition of the program. No inmate otherwise eligible
under the provisions of this section for placement with the program may be so placed
unless he has qualified under the selection criteria and process authorized, by the
provisions of Section 24-13-710. He must also have maintained a clear disciplinary
record for at least six months prior to eligibility for placement with the program.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-720 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
4. "No . . .ex post facto law. . . shalt be passed.. . ." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4. "No
State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-710 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (amended 1993).
6. Plyler II, __ S.C. at_, 438 S.E.2d at 246 (citing North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244
S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964)).
7. Id. at __ n.1, 438 S.E.2d at 245 n.1.
8. Id. at n.1, 438 S.E.2d at 245 n.1 (citing Gunter v. State, 298 S.C. 113, 378 S.E.2d
443 (1989), overruled in part, Griffin v. State, _ S.C. _, 433 S.E.2d 862 (1993), cert.
denied, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994)).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-710 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (amended 1993).
10. Record at 29.
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participation are different for the two programs. Participation in SFI section
710 requires:
carefully screened and selected inmates who have served the mandatory
minimum sentence as required by law or have not committed a violent
crime as defined in § 16-1-60 nor committed the crime of criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree as defined in § 16-3-654 or the crime of
committing or attempting a lewd act upon a child under the age of fourteen
as defined in § 16-15-140 to be released on furlough .... Eligibility
criteria for the program include, but are not limited to, all of the following
requirements:
(1) maintain a clear disciplinary record for at least six
months prior to consideration for placement on the
program;
(2) demonstrate to Department of Corrections' officials a
general desire to become a law-abiding member of
society;
(3) satisfy any other reasonable requirements #mposed upon
him by the Department of Corrections;
(4) have an identifiable need for and willingness to partici-
pate in authorized community-based programs and
rehabilitative services;
(5) have been committed to the State Department of Correc-
tions with a total sentence of five years or less as the first
or second adult commitment for a criminal offense for
which the inmate received a sentence of one year or
more.
1
Section 720 provides:
Unless sentenced to life inprisonment [sic], an inmate... shall, within six
months of the expiration of his sentence, be placed with the program
provided for in § 24-13-710 and shall be subject to every rule, regulation,
and condition of such program. No inmate ... may be so placed unless
he has maintained a clear disciplinary record for at least six months prior
to eligibility .... 12
Since section 720's adoption in 1983, state agencies interpreted section 720 as
incorporating the stricter eligibility requirements of section 710. In Plyler v.
Evatt13 (Plyler 1) the inmates brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-710 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (amended 1993).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-720 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (amended 1993).
13. 305 S.C. 488, 409 S.E.2d 416 (1991).
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interpretation of section 710 and section 720. The inmates challenged the
agencies' interpretation of section 720 as restricting the program in section 710
to inmates within six months of the expiration of their sentences. On
expedited appeal, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court's holding that
the statutes referred to two different classes of inmates and that restrictions
under section 710 are not implied in section 720.14 However, the court
upheld the agencies' practice of allowing releases under section 710 only when
inmates were six months from their sentences' expiration."5 The court relied
on section 710's giving the department discretion to add other eligibility
requirements. 
1 6
In May 1992 the inmates brought a new declaratory judgment action
based on Plyler I challenging the agencies' discretionary incorporation of the
eligibility requirements of section 710 into the section 720 program. The
circuit court found for the inmates. 17 The supreme court granted expedited
appeal and heard the case on June 8, 1993. Six days later the governor signed
an amendment to section 24-13-720 that incorporated the stricter requirements
of section 710 into section 720.18 The supreme court requested supplemental
briefs on whether the -passage of the amendment rendered the litigation
moot.19 The court held that section 720 did not incorporate section 710 and
that the 1993 amendment constituted a change in the law.20 The appellant
agencies petitioned for rehearing, requesting clarification of which classes of
inmates were to be released under the court's decision and to decide the ex
post facto issue. The court granted the petition and refiled Plyler HJ.21
In Plyler II the court addressed three issues: (1) the interpretation of
section 710 and section 720; (2) the 1993 amendment's effect; and (3) the
designation of the class of inmates entitled to release under the court's
interpretation of the preamendment statute, the 1993 amendment, and the Ex
Post Facto Clauses of the South Carolina and United States Constitutions.
Affirming the circuit court, the court held that the conditions for
participation created by section 710 are not implied in section 720. - The
court relied on Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget & Control Board'2 to find
tliat the agencies' longtime construction of section 720 was not dispositive and
14. Id. at 491, 409 S.E.2d at 417.
15. Id. at 491, 409 S.E.2d at 417-18.
16. Id.
17. Plyler 11, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 245; Record at 6-7.
18. H. Res. 3975 (1993).
19. Order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (June 30, 1993).
20. Plyler v. Evatt, No. 23928, 1993 WL 335152 (S.C. Aug. 26, 1993), withdrawn and
superseded, Plyler II, _ S.C. __, 438 S.E.2d 444 (1993).
21. Order of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Nov. 8, 1993).
22. Plyler II, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 246.
23. _ S.C. _,423 S.E.2d 101 (1992) (per curiam).
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that the court should interpret the statute to follow the legislative intent.24
The court agreed with the circuit court's finding that the legislative intent of
section 720 was "to ensure a supervised transition period for inmates returning
to society after an extended period of incarceration. "I
The court held that the 1993 amendment expressly incorporating section
710's eligibility requirements into section 720 did not clarify but changed the
law and, therefore, did not show the legislative intent of the original statute.
26
Instead, the court held that the amendment materially changed the law.
Given Plyler rs holding and the 1993 amendment to section 720, the
court had to identify the class of inmates who had to meet the more stringent
1993 requirements.
Applying the new requirements to all inmates raised ex post facto
concerns. "The ax post facto clause protects against retroactive legislative
provisions which are disadvantageous to the offender."27 The critical date
for ex post facto analysis is the date the inmate committed the offense.2"
However, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not protect people from every law
passed after their offense date. Instead, the Constitution prevents a new law
from adversely affecting a person if that law involves changes in matters of
substance altering substantial personal rights, such as increasing punishment
or changing elements of the offense.29 Ex post facto analysis focuses on
whether the change is substantive or procedural.3" The United States
Supreme Court established the test for ex post facto violations as follows:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law,
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.
2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less,
or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commis-
sion of the offence, in order to convict the offender.31
24. Plyler If, - S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 246.
25. Id. at __,438 S.E.2d at 246.
26. Id. at , 438 S.E.2d at 246 (citing North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137
S.E.2d 264 (1964) ("An amendment which materially changes the terminology of a statute under
some circumstances indicates persuasively and raises a presumption that a departure from the
original law was intended.")).
27. Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456, 459, 409 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1991) (citing Miller v.
Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987)).
28. Id. at 459, 409 S.E.2d at 399.
29. See id. at 459, 409 S.E.2d at 399; State v. Huiett, 302 S.C. 169, 171, 394 S.E.2d 486,
487 (1990) (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430).
30. See Elmore, 305 S.C. at 459, 409 S.E.2d at 399 (citing Miller, 482 U.S. at 430); Huiett,
302 S.C. at 171, 394 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430).
31. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (quoted inHuiett, 302 S.C. at 171, 394 S.E.2d
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In Plyler II the court found no ex post facto violation in applying the 1993
amendment to inmates who committed their offenses before its effective
date. 2 The court held that all prisoners who met the requirements of section
720 before the 1993 amendment could participate in the SFII program.3
Those who had not must meet the amended statute's additional requirements.
In a footnote, the court addresses the ex post facto issue.34 The court
explained: "There is no ex post facto violation in applying the amended
statute's criteria to individuals who committed offenses before its effective date
because the Program is not part of the defendant's sentence.""
In Gunter petitioner argued that the application of eligibility criteria for
participation in SF1 added by amendment after his offense date constituted an
ex post facto violation. The court rejected the argument because "the furlough
program is not part of the sentencing process.""
The Gunter court relied on Milhouse v. Levi.37 In Milhouse the court
rejected the inmates' argument that the addition of requirements to the
furlough statute curtailed their furlough privileges, inflicting greater punish-
ment upon them than was possible when they committed their offenses. 8
The Gunter court emphasized Milhouse, which distinguished parole from
furlough programs. The latter are "internal rehabilitation procedures that are
not an integral part of the sentencing process. "39 The Gunter court also
found that the legislative purpose of section 710 was to alleviate prison
overcrowding and not to confer substantial rights on the affected prisoners.40
However, Gunter is factually distinguishable from Plyler II; in Gunter the
ex post facto analysis involved section 710, whereas Plyler II involved section
720. In finding that the eligibility requirements of one section did not apply
to the other, the Plyler II court noted that the two statutes involved different
programs. However, the court did not consider the differences in the two
statutes in its ex post facto analysis.
The critical distinction in the two statutes is that section 710 is discretion-
ary whereas, before the 1993 amendment, section 720 was mandatory,
at 487).
32. Plyler II, _ S.C. at _ n.1, 438 S.E.2d at 245 n.1.
33. Id. at __,438 S.E.2d at 245.
34. Id. at __ n.1, 438 S.E.2d at 245 n.1.
35. Id. at n.1, 438 S.E.2d at 245 n.1 (citing Gunter v. State, 298 S.C. 113, 378 S.E.2d
443 (1989) (per curiarn), overruled in part, Griffin v. State, _ S.C. _, 433 S.E.2d 862
(1993), cert. denied, _ U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 924 (1994)).
36. Gunter, 298 S.C. at 117, 378 S.E.2d at 445.
37. 548 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. Id. at 363-64.
39. Gunter, 298 S.C. at 117, 378 S.E.2d at 445 (discussingMilhouse, 548 F.2d 357 (1976)).
40. Id. (citing Anders v. South Carolina Parole & Community Corrections Bd., 279 S.C.
206, 305 S.E.2d 229 (1983) (per curiam)).
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requiring the Department of Corrections to release all inmates, with certain
exceptions, who were within six months of their sentences' expiration. 4 The
inmates argued that because of the statute's mandatory language, early release
into SF11 became a part of their sentences, 4' and thus any disadvantageous
change in the program would deprive them of a substantial right. The
mandatory language of section 720 provides the inmates with a stronger
argument than they would have had under section 710's discretionary
language. Thus, under Calder v. Bull, the inmates could argue that the
amendment's retroactive application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because
it inflicted a greater punishment than existing at the time of offense.
The court has recognized this argument before. In analyzing a different
issue in Gunter, the court noted a difference in ex post facto analysis of
discretionary and mandatory statutes.43 The court found: "The Board of
Corrections has discretion whether to allow an inmate even to participate in
a work release program. Therefore, participation in a work release program
is a privilege, giving rise to no vested rights cognizable under the ex post facto
doctrine."I In Plyler II the inmates arguably had a vested right to partici-
pate in the program, which was mandatory upon the fulfillment of three
eligibility requirements. This right would not be available to inmates under
the discretionary provisions of section 710.
Furthermore, even if the court correctly relied on Gunter by treating
sections 710 and 720 equally for ex post facto analysis, the Gunter decision
itself is questionable. In Gunter the court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause
does not apply to furlough programs.4' The court relied on Milhouse, which
is factually distinguishable from Gunter. The Milhouse furlough program was
fundamentally different from South Carolina's supervised furlough programs.
Unlike the programs in South Carolina, the Milhouse program permitted
inmates to leave prison for certain time periods, after which they had to return
to the correctional facility.46 In Anders the South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized that "[i]t was obviously not the intent of the legislature to use the
word 'furlough' in a technical sense."'v The Anders court grouped section
710 with other statutes providing for leniency and "for the service of less time
in prison than that specified in the judge's sentence."4 Because of the way
the SFI and SFII programs operate, the programs are arguably more akin to
41. See Plyler 11, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 245.
42. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 3-4.
43. See Gunter, 298 S.C. at 116, 378 S.E.2d at 444.
44. Id. (citation omitted) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976) and People
v. Miller, 434 N.Y.S.2d 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
45. Id. at 117, 378 S.E.2d at 445.
46. Milhouse, 548 F.2d at 361 n.9 (involving 18 U.S.C. § 4082(c) (1).
47. Anders, 279 S.C. at 209, 305 S.E.2d at 230.
48. Id.
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work release programs, parole, or good behavior credits, all of which might
afford a different result under ex post facto analysis.49
The court could have avoided the constitutional issue by finding that
section 720 incorporated section 710. Finding an incorporation also would
have avoided contradicting Plyler I. The court could have found that although
sections 710 and 720 provided two distinct programs, section 720 incorporated
section 710's conditions. The court made no mention of unambiguous
language and stated that the court's duty is to effectuate the legislative
intent.50 The court held that the legislative intent in creating SFII was to help
prisoners integrate into society."
In conclusion, in Plyler II the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
the 1989 version of section 720 as not incorporating the eligibility require-
ments of section 710. The court found that legislative intent dictated the
result. Given the agencies' construction of the statute, the court's conclusion
is questionable. Also, the court interpreted the 1993 amendment to section
720 as changing the law and applied the amendment's requirements to all
inmates who had not yet qualified for the program. The court relied on
factually distinguishable cases to find that this application did not violate Ex
Post Facto Clause.
Alicia Allsbrook Richardson
IV. COURT FINDS No FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICT
IN BAN ON 'LOUD AND UNSEEMLY' SPEECH
In the split decision of City of Beaufort v. Baker' the South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance
prohibiting "'loud and unseemly noises.'"2 Finding the ordinance sufficiently
definite to survive vagueness allegations3 and content-neutral,4 the court
49. See, e.g., Gunter, 298 S.C. at 116, 378 S.E.2d at 444 (noting in dicta that a mandatory
work release program might give rise to a vested right that could not be disadvantaged by an ex
post facto law); Roller v. Cavanaugh, 984 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, _
U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2412, cert. dismissed, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 593 (1993) (holding that
amended statute altering the conditions of pre-existing parole eligibility violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
50. Plyler II, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 246 (citing Gilstrap, _ S.C. _, 423 S.E.2d
101).
51. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 246.
1. ___S.C., 432 S.E.2d 470 (1993).
2. Id. at, 432 S.E.2d at 472, 474 (quoting BEAUFORT, S.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9-
1008 (a) (1991)).
3. Id. at ,432 S.E.2d at 474.
4. Id. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 472.
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relied heavily upon the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Eanes v.
Maryland.5 There, the Maryland court upheld as a valid time, place, and
manner restriction on free speech the Maryland statute upon which Beaufort
based its ordinance.6 Unlike the Eanes court, however, the South Carolina
court summarily addressed the constitutional issues surrounding the Beaufort
ordinance and possibly failed to consider critical differences between the Eanes
and Baker situations.
Baker involved a situation typical in many towns and cities across the
United States. For almost seventeen years, Karl Baker and members of his
church went to downtown Beaufort to preach on Saturdays. Starting at noon
and continuing for thirty to sixty minutes, each would speak for several
moments from the sidewalks of the downtown business district.7 This area
was occupied exclusively by merchants and customers.
Baker and others were charged on November 2, 1991, November 16,
1991, November 23, 1991, December 14, 1991, and January 4, 1992 with
violating section 9-1008(a) of the Beaufort city code, a recently amended noise
ordinance! They were convicted on all charges. Baker and the other
preachers appealed contending that the ordinance was not a valid time, place,
and manner restriction on their freedom of speech rights under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I, section two
of the South Carolina Constitution.9
Citing only one United States Supreme Court case, Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,"° and relying almost exclusively upon Eanes," the South Carolina
court upheld the ordinance. The majority found that the ordinance was a
valid, content-neutral regulation of speech based "solely upon the noise
generated, rather than the message conveyed."1 The court found the
ordinance narrowly tailored to serve Beaufort's significant interest in
protecting the downtown business area, stating that "government 'ha[s] a
5. 569 A.2d 604 (Md. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1990).
6. See Baker, _ S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 472.
7. Brief of Appellant at 1-2, 7.
8. Baker, - S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 472. The Beaufort ordinance was amended
October 22, 1991, and reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to willfully disturb any
neighborhood or business in the City by making or continuing loud and unseemly noises, or by
profanely cursing and swearing, or using obscene language." BEAUFORT, S.C., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 9-1008(a) (1991). Notably, the ordinance also prohibits the use of horns,
amplification equipment, radios, and other sound equipmentthat "cause loud or irritating noises."
Id. § 9-1008(b). In these cases, however, the ordinance defines the standard to determine a
violation as noises "which are plainly audible from a distance of fifty (50) feet from [their]
source." Id.
9. Baker, - S.C. at __, 432 5.E.2d at 472.
10. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
11. See Baker, S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 471-72.
12. Id. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 472.
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substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.'" 13 The
court also found that the ordinance properly regulated speech because
merchants could not "'escape the bombardment of their sensibilities'" as a
captive audience14 and because "alternative avenues of communication"
remained open. 5 The court noted, "Appellants' opportunity to convey their
religious message is not proscribed by the Ordinance. Numerous alternative
avenues of communication are available, including passing out leaflets or
preaching at a lower volume."16
The court's analysis correctly reflects current First Amendment jurispru-
dence. In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 17 the
United States Supreme Court outlined the test applicable to restrictions of
speech in traditional public forums such as the sidewalks involved here:
In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication. 8
So long as a governmental regulation "is 'justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech,'" the restriction is content-neutral.19 Indeed,
reference to the religious content of the speech does not seem necessary.20
13. Id. at __, 432 S.E.2d at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 796).
14. Id. at __, 432 S.E.2d at 473 (quoting Eanes, 569 A.2d 604, 612 (Md. 1990).
15. Id. at __, 432 S.E.2d at 473.
16. Baker, _ S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 473.
17. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
18. Id. at45 (citations omitted); see Ward, 491 U.S. at791; Frisbyv. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (applying public fora test to residential neighborhood streets).
19. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
20. Quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. __, __, 112 S. Ct. 2395,
2403 (1992), the Appellant argued that a "'[l]istener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral
basis for regulation.'" Brief of Appellant at 2. In Forsyth County, the Court struck down an
ordinance that allowed a county administrator to set a license fee for any parade, assembly, or
demonstration on public property on the basis of anticipated security costs to control the public
reaction to the speech. Although the county argued that the ordinance was constitutionally valid
because it was aimed at the secondary effects of the speech and not its content, the Court held
that the fee's justification could not be characterized as "'ha[ving] nothing to do with content.'"
Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at _, 112 S.Ct. at 2403 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 792); cf. City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (holding that time, place, and manner
regulation of adult theaters as part of a zoning scheme aimed at reducing crime and other
secondary effects associated with such establishments was content-neutral because it was
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The South Carolina court readily accepted the "loud and unseemly"
definition of Eanes in deciding that the ordinance was content-neutral and
narrowly tailored. 2 Applying the terms' common definitions, the Maryland
court noted, "loud" "is 'characterized by high volume and intensity of sound
... clamorous and insistent.' 'Unseemly' and its synonyms such as 'improp-
er,' 'indecorous,' 'indelicate,' mean 'in violation of accepted standards of what
is right or proper.'"' Finding that unseemly modified loud, the Maryland
court reasoned that the phrase regulated loud and unseemly noises under a
reasonableness standard "informed by the circumstances. "3
Whether this content-neutral definition is narrowly tailored hinges upon
the government's significant interest in protecting citizens from noise. While
also citing business interests of merchants, the Baker majority seemed to rely
upon.a captive audience theory in holding that the Beaufort ordinance serves
a significant governmental interest. In so holding, the court cites Eanes
again.24
Although Eanes also involved street preachers,' the Baker court failed
to recognize an important distinction between the two situations in relation to
the captive-audience concern. Eanes involved not only a business district but
several residential apartments and homes. The Maryland court noted that the
preaching "awaken[ed] adults sleeping in their homes, prevent[ed] children
from taking their naps, and ma[de] it impossible for workers to concentrate on
their work."26 As such, the Maryland court's captive audience concern
focused on the speech's invasion into the residential areas.27
While the Supreme Court recognizes that the captive-audience doctrine
can extend beyond the home,' generally the Court limits such application to
"'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech'") (quoting Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). Unlike
in Forsyth County, no reference to the speech itself would be necessary here.
21. See City of Beaufort v. Baker, _ S.C. _, __, 432 S.E.2d 470, 474 (1993).
22. Eanes v. Maryland, 569 A.2d 604, 610 (Md. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting In
re Nawrocki, 289 A.2d 846, 849 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972)).
23. Id.
24. See Baker, __ S.C. at __, 432 S.E.2d at 473.
25. See Eanes, 569 A.2d at 606.
26. Id. at 613.
27. See id.
28. As the plurality in Ward stated: "[I]t can no longer be doubted that government 'ha[s]
a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.'" Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (quoting Members of City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984)). The Court further explained:
This interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to protect "the well-
being, tranquility, and privacy of the home," but it is by no means limited to that
context, for the government may act to protect even such traditional public forums
as city streets and parks from excessive noise.
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rare, specific, well-defined circumstances. The Justices have disagreed on
even limited application beyond the home, causing numerous concurring and
dissenting opinions.
For example, in the plurality opinion of Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,29 the Supreme Court extended the captive audience principle to the
interior of a municipal rapid transit system.3" Finding that the city was
engaged in commerce, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting political
advertisements in the city's rapid transit system. The Court noted that the city
need not accept all advertisements sought for the interior billboards, just as
radio and television operators need not accept every offer of advertisement.3
Seemingly important to the designation of the bus interior as a captive
audience environment, the Court pointed out that "[h]ere, we have no open
spaces, no meeting hall, park, street comer, or other public thoroughfare...
[The city] must provide rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive service
to the commuters of Shaker Heights.
32
In Eanes the Maryland court cited Lehman as extending the captive
audience principle beyond the home.33 However, clearly the Lehman Court,
at least the plurality, did not find that a purely traditional public forum
operates as a possible captive audience environment. 34 The other case cited
by the Eanes court to support its proposition, 3 Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford,36 involved a city ordinance that limited picketing outside of school
buildings to times when school was not in session. The Supreme Court
concluded that although "we think it clear that the public sidewalk adjacent to
school grounds may not be declared off limits for expressive activity by
members of the public[,] ... expressive activity may be prohibited if it
'materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.'" 37  Notably, Grayned does not discuss a captive
audience concern. 38
Id. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1948)). There the Court dealt with amplified sound affecting public fora and residential
areas. See id. at 784.
29. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
30. Id. at 302-04.
31. Id. at 303-04.
32. Id. at 303.
33. See Eanes v. Maryland, 569 A.2d 604, 612 (Md. 1990).
34. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302-03.
35. See Eanes, 569 A.2d at 612.
36. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
37. Id. at 118 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513 (1969)).
38. Cited in the Eanes discussion of captive audiences in traditional public forums, see 569
A.2d at 612, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), also is distinguishable because it involved
a sound truck and not an unamplified voice. See 336 U.S. at 79.
[Vol. 46
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss1/3
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Cohen v. California39 contains one of the Supreme Court's few majority
discussions of the captive audience principle. There, the Court struck down
the conviction of Cohen under California's breach of the peace statute and
refused to extend the captive audience doctrine to a public courthouse.'
Cohen was arrested in a county courthouse for "wearing a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft.' '"41 Although the state argued that the jacket forced
others unwillingly to endure the distasteful expression, the Court held that no
captive audience concern prevailed.
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words,
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this
authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply
as a matter of personal predilections.
In this regard, persons confronted with Cohen's jacket were in a quite
different posture than, say, those subjected to the raucous emissions of
sound trucks blaring outside their residences. Those in the Los Angeles
courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibili-
ties simply by averting their eyes .... [The statute here] indiscriminately
sweeps within its prohibitions all "offensive conduct" that disturbs "any
neighborhood or person. "42
While sound may indeed be "one of the most intrusive means of
communication, "41 the Baker court's approach to the captive audience
principle in the traditional public forum appears misplaced.' Clearly a
restriction need not use the least restrictive means available to succeed under
the time, place, and manner analysis.45 But, if the Baker c6urt's analysis
39. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
40. See id. at 21-22.
41. Id. at 16 (quoting California v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969),
rev'd, 404 U.S. 876 (1971)).
42. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
43. Eanes, 569 A.2d at 612.
44. Notably, all of the cases cited in Eanes and accepted by the Baker court for the
proposition that pure, unamplified speech can be regulated in the traditional public forum
involved amplified sound. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (concluding
that limitations upon amplified concerts in Central Park are valid under a time, place, and manner
analysis coupled with a captive audience concern); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, at 87-89
(1949) (upholding an ordinance that banned loud and raucous amplified sound trucks from city
streets); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (finding unconstitutionala city ordinance
prohibiting use of amplified sound equipment except with permission of police); Reeves v.
McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that limitations of amplification
under a wattage standard are not inherently overbroad).
45. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 797.
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rests upon captive audience concerns, the South Carolina court's application
of the doctrine beyond the home is highly questionable. Again, unlike Eanes,
the record does not indicate that the noise disturbed people in their homes.
Conceding a captive audience concern, the speech probably did not violate
such a substantial right that it would be intolerable under the Cohen standard.
Whether the ordinance leaves alternatives open to the preachers is
questionable. The court stated, "Numerous alternative avenues of communica-
tion are available, including passing out leaflets or preaching at a lower
volume. "46 However, in upholding narrowly tailored regulations of speech,
the Supreme Court historically has not required individuals to sacrifice pure
speech in favor of other methods. Holding that the ban on sound trucks was
constitutional in Kovacs, the Court stated that "no restriction upon the
communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice" was
involved.47
The Baker holding also should be balanced against the instructive words
of Justice Harlan in Cohen:
[We cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode
involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot
sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content
of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which,
practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated.4"
Although not addressing pure speech, Justice Harlan's words are equally
pertinent when considering alternative avenues of communication. Here, the
evangelistic preacher expressed the group's message in a unique style and
manner. It is doubtful that reducing their message to soft-spoken conversation
or leaflets would carry the emotive impact that the preachers sought to convey.
Content-neutral on its face, the ordinance nevertheless has the ultimate
effect of banning the speech of these street preachers for what it is:
evangelistic preaching. The lpolice admitted that they did not determine
independently whether the preaching violated the statute, relying instead upon
the complaints of area merchants; "[Tihe police department acknowledges that
the ordinance places in the hands of the complainant the determination of the
sound level required for enforcement. " " If the speech's emotive force is as
46. Baker, _ S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 473.
47. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89.
48. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
49. Baker, _ S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 476 (Toal, J., dissenting).
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important as the actual words used, there seems to be little distinction between
the words conveyed and the loud, evangelistic style in which they were
presented. Each one depends upon the other.
Justice Eldridge's dissenting opinion in Eanes highlights the content-
neutrality problems associated with this determination. Eldridge suggested that
if two individuals were to speak in similar areas, reaching the same volume,
the standard adopted under the statute would naturally favor the speech that
people were less likely to find offensive. He also noted that more popular
speakers might be favored. Similarly, he noted that one contemplating a
speech in the downtown area could not determine the level of speech allowed
under the statute.50
Thus, the Baker decision appears to deprive an evangelistic preacher of
the ability to communicate his message in the manner unique to the genre.
Any merchant can determine whether a preacher's manner is loud and
unseemly under the circumstances without reference to a reasonable person
standard. 1 Even the Appellant acknowledged that an explicit reasonable
person standard might be valid.52
Clearly, the Beaufort city ordinance inadequately informed the street
preachers of the prohibited speech. Notably, the street preachers made several
requests to the Beaufort police for clarification of the ordinance. However,
as Justice Toal's dissent noted:
50. See Eanes v. Maryland, 569 A.2d 604, 631-32 (Md. 1990) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
Also, suppose, for example, an evangelical congregation rents space in the downtown business
district and holds a revival in its storefront church. With the windows raised, the minister begins
to deliver his sermon. A neighboring businessman calls and complains. Would the Beaufort
ordinance be applicable in this situation under the Baker standard?
51. Discussing the narrowly tailored requirement, the Baker court "reject[ed] Appellants'
contentions that the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored because it does not provide for a decibel
level standard but, rather, is dependent upon complaints from the citizens." Baker, _ S.C. at
__, 432 S.E.2d at 473. However, the appellant did not argue that only a decibel level would
be appropriate. Instead, the appellant argued that:
It is clear there are less restrictive methods available to accomplish the City's
objective of limiting excessive noise. And these alternatives do not depend on
listeners' reactions to justify enforcement ...
The Beaufort ordinance has no standards telling how the terms 'loud and
unseemly' [sic] are to be interpreted or enforced.
Brief of Appellant at 3-4.
52. Brief of Appellant at 5. Several states have upheld ordinances and statutes that contain
an express reasonableness standard. See, e.g., New York v. Bakolas, 449 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y.
1983) (per curiam); Boling v. Parrett, 536 P.2d 1272 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); City of Madison v.
Baumann, 470 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1991). Such regulations appear to define sufficiently the
prohibited speech and fall clearly within time, place, and manner jurisprudence without reference
to a captive audience concern. An explicit reasonableness standard also raises fewer content-
neutrality concerns because the ordinance would not be enforced by reference to a single
listener's reaction.
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Unfortunately, the only answers Baker received were vague suggestions that it
was either for "the court to decide," or that "it's based on a merchant's
complaint." The mere fact that the police department [was] unable to describe
what conduct or noise level [was] offensive is stark testimony to the vagueness
of the ordinance. 3
Not mentioned by the Baker court, interestingly Eanes requires police officers
to issue a warning under the Maryland statute before arresting an individual
for violating the statute.54 If the statute's meaning were clear and unambigu-
ous, providing a reasonableness standard when considering the ordinary
meaning of loud and unseemly, why would a warning be necessary each time
before an arrest?
Certainly, municipalities can impose valid time, place, and manner
restrictions upon the exercise of pure speech. Ordinances that are content-
neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a significant interest are valid if ample
opportunities for alternative communication remain. Those that are not
content-neutral are valid if narrowly drawn to a compelling state interest.
Captive audience concerns can enter into either of these situations. But by
overlooking the differences between Baker and Eanes, the South Carolina
court opened the door to content discrimination based not upon the exact
words used, but upon the uniquely historical manner necessary to deliver
them. The Baker court should have required a more carefully drawn
ordinance, not necessarily including a decibel level or even a range-of-hearing
measurement, but at least an explicit reasonableness standard. Then, the
court's decision would fit squarely within current First Amendment jurispru-
dence without raising disturbing questions about content-neutrality and captive
audience concerns.
Michael R. Sullivan
53. Baker, _ S.C. at _, 432 S.E.2d at 476 (Toal, J., dissenting).
54. Eanes, 569 A.2d at 617.
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